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ABSTRACT
Smart homes made up of Internet of Things (IoT) devices
have seen wide deployment in recent years, with most, if not
all, of them controlled by remote servers in the cloud. Such
designs raise security and privacy concerns for end users.
We believe that the current situation has largely resulted
from lacking a systematic home IoT framework to support
localized end user control.
To let end users take back the control of smart homes, we
propose Sovereign, an IoT system framework that allows
users to securely control home IoT systems without depend-
ing on a cloud backend. Unlike existing solutions, Sovereign
networks home IoT devices and applications using named
data with application-level semantics; the names are then
used to construct security mechanisms. Users define security
policies and these policies are then executed by the localized
security modules. We implement Sovereign as a pub/sub
based development platform together with a prototype lo-
cal IoT controller. Our preliminary evaluation shows that
Sovereign provides an easy-to-use systematic solution to
secure smart homes under user control without imposing
noticeable overhead.
1 INTRODUCTION
Home Internet-of-Things (IoT) is coming of age [19]. At the
moment, tech giants have provided Home IoT platforms [1–
3, 16, 23, 33] utilizing their mature cloud computing infras-
tructures. Relying on cloud backends to varying degrees,
these platforms network home devices and applications with
different functionalities to offer a good experience to end
users.
Intuitively, a user should have full control of smart de-
vices and applications, in a way similar to her full control of
conventional home appliances, without reliance on external
parties. Unfortunately, this is not the case: most, if not all,
of today’s deployed smart home systems are controlled by
remote servers in the cloud, raising various user privacy and
security issues [10, 22, 30, 36, 37]. For example, end users’
private data becomes cloud-accessible. Also, any failure in
the cloud may threaten the safety and privacy of millions
of users, e.g., unavailability [11] caused by the cloud out-
age or unauthorized remote control [14] due to erroneously
designed cloud applications.
Why are there a lack of products to allow direct user
control in the age of smart homes? We believe there are
two main reasons. First, as data is the new currency, data
generated at smart homes is a highly desirable resource [34]
for service providers. Second, there seems a lack of highly
secure and highly usable solution to enable user-controlled
smart homes.
In this work, we aim to solve the second problem by ex-
ploring a new direction – designing a home IoT system to
be controlled by end user, without external dependencies.
Specifically, we want to enable end users to directly manage
their home devices, applications, resources (i.e., content and
executables) and their privileges locally, so we aim to develop
a systematic home IoT framework to realize it. Such a frame-
work should provide application developers with easy-to-use
APIs and built-in localized security support and not expose
new burden on end users from a system design perspective.
We believe that once viable technical solutions are devel-
oped that meet users’ needs, new market can be opened as
an answer to the first issue.
In this paper we present Sovereign, a home IoT system
framework to make the home an autonomous system solely
controlled by end users. More specifically, Sovereign se-
cures and verifies all communications strictly following user-
defined polices (e.g., which device/application can use which
service or access which piece of data) locally.
Our solutions have three major parts:
1. Utilizing semantic-rich names across the entire
system (§4). We propose a set of naming conventions to
name each entity and resource in the local system based on
Named Data Networking (NDN) [43]. Each name, carried in
network packets, provides application-level information for
the system to make security-related decisions. Importantly,
with each entity properly named, security policies can be
realized by defining the relations between semantically-rich
names.
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2. Building localized security modules (§5). To enable
end user control, Sovereign develops three localized security
modules – security bootstrapping, trust management, and
access control. Moreover, these modules operate on each
system participant in a decentralized way and enforce user-
defined policies for every data exchange and device action.
3. Usable framework with security designed-in (§6).
Sovereign seamlessly integrates security modules into the ba-
sic pub-sub communication API. Following user-defined poli-
cies, security modules automatically add/check security on
each outgoing/incoming packet within the procedure of pub
and sub. Therefore, developers can easily build devices/appli-
cations that support local user control in Sovereign without
having to be security experts themselves.
We implement Sovereign as an IoT application develop-
ment platform (§7). The platform has been developed and
maintained for over one year and has been used by several
campuses across the world. Sovereign SDK follows a mod-
ular design and can be adopted by any IoT platform that
supports standard C language. Along with the development
platform, we also provide a python-based prototype con-
troller for the user to control their home. Our preliminary
evaluation results show that Sovereign does not pose new
manual operations from end users, and it is easy for IoT de-
velopers to port existing IoT applications onto Sovereign so
as to be user locally controlled; in addition, Sovereign real-
izes user local control without causing noticeable additional
overhead to network delay and constrained IoT devices (§8).
Our contribution is to show a new way of building home
IoT systems that empower end users. A home should be an
autonomous system controlled by the home owner, and Sov-
ereign lets the owner take back the control from large cloud
providers. Our work also contributes to recent new trends
(e.g.,Web 3.0, Solid [8]) which aim to return the control of
user data into users’ hands.
2 MOTIVATION
In this section, we provide the motivation for our work. We
begin by setting up the background of today’s smart home
IoT systems (§2.1). We then introduce the security and pri-
vacy issues that have been widely identified and why local
user control can potentially address these issues (§2.2). We
also discuss existing attempts to provide local home control
and their limitations (§2.3). Finally, we introduce our insights
on realizing local user control (§2.4).
2.1 Cloud-based Home IoT Systems
Typical cloud-based home IoT platforms like Samsung’s Smart-
Things [33], Amazon’s AWS Home IoT [2], and Google IoT
core [16], now account for a big share of the market. Accord-
ing to Samsung [41], SmartThings have 52 million active
users across the world by Jan 2020. They serve end users
with a cloud-based backend.
The cloud backend is the core in these systems because it
usually serves as the authority to (i) bootstrap and manage
home devices/applications, (ii) authenticate commands (e.g.,
unlock the door), and to (iii) manage access rights to data (e.g.,
access to the temperature of the home). Under this model,
smart home devices and applications build secured channels
like Transport Layer Security (TLS) to the cloud backend
and delegate control to the cloud. Here, we use Samsung’s
SmartThings IoT as an example.
SmartThings’ ecosystem has three main components: the
SmartThings cloud backend, cloud-connected devices, and
cloud-hosted applications. To join a SmartThings system, de-
vices and applications must have the SmartThings certificate
pre-installed as the trust anchor. Also, their developers need
to register their products to SmartThings in advance, and
SmartThings will remember unique IDs and public keys of
registered devices and applications. The cloud backend is a
rendezvous point of devices and applications, and it man-
ages the whole system through OAuth [17]: applications or
devices must have OAuth tokens from the cloud backend
before they can assess home resources.
Therefore, we can see the cloud backend in SmartThings
provides all three control-related functions listed above. Sim-
ilar results can also be observed in other cloud-based home
IoT systems including AWS IoT, Google IoT Core, and Mi-
crosoft’s Azure IoT system (see Appendix A).
On today’s home IoT market, Apple’s HomeKit [3] encour-
ages local communication and allows users to directly con-
trol their home IoT system without going through the cloud.
This is aligned with the same goal of our work. However,
HomeKit still relies on the cloud for device authentication
and trust management.
2.2 Security and Privacy Issues
In cloud-based home IoT platforms, a cloud backend is in
the control loop, potentially causing several critical issues to
end users.
First, end users’ activities and data are directly exposed
to the back-end cloud service, which greatly violates user’s
privacy [10]. Ren et. al [28] show that more than half of stud-
ied IoT devices share information to third parties or support
parties. Recent years have also witnessed a increasing num-
ber of smart home data leakage [12, 15]. Second, a home IoT
system can suffer from both availability and implementation
issues from the cloud. As witnessed in the recent news [11],
users cannot even unlock their homewhen the cloud is down.
Fernandes et. al [14] have pointed out severe overprivilege
issues in SmartThings that can directly threaten millions
of homes around the world. Third, outgoing traffic from
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the home also increases attack surface. Recent research [5]
shows that an ISP or network observer can infer private user
information by analyzing encrypted traffic sent from a smart
home system.
2.3 Existing Attempts to Provide User
Control
We are not the first to identify issues in the cloud-based IoT
systems. Various approaches have been proposed to enforce
user control without relying on the cloud. These approaches
have merit and provide innovative techniques to help solve
the problem, yet we argue these approaches do not realize
user control that is fully independent of the cloud or fail to
be fine-grained enough to control home systems.
Approaches [9, 13, 20, 40] try to add run time enforcement
by modifying existing IoT application programs or patching
extra data flow verification into the system backend. These
approaches help to enforce user control on cloud-hosted
applications; however, they do not break the cloud-based
system model and aforementioned issues are not addressed.
Home automation projects like openHAB [25] and Home
Assistant [18] add another layer of control over the exist-
ing devices from different IoT systems through a local au-
tomation hub. Through the local hub, openHAB and Home
Assistant empower end users by allowing them to control
IoT devices locally. Nevertheless, to control a cloud-based
device, for example, a SmartThings sensor, the local hub
usually needs to contact device’s cloud backend directly or
indirectly, so the cloud is still in the control loop. Moreover,
these approaches do not provide solutions to managing the
privileges of system participants.
Another direction is to put user control at the network
layer [13, 24, 31, 32, 35, 39]. Their main ideas are similar:
given all devices are accessed through the local network,
a dedicated manager can provide user control by allowing
or blocking network packets based on user-defined policies
(e.g., through Software Defined Network). These approaches,
however, have a mismatch in their systems, that is, the appli-
cation’s rich semantics versus the network’s poor ability to
understand it. For example, one can obtain little application-
related information from an IP header or other network layer
headers such as that in Zigbee [46]. Therefore, it leads to
coarse granularity of control. For example, SDN can block
or allow the traffic to a smart door lock; however, it cannot
distinguish whether a packet is to read the battery state or
to unlock the door. Although there are increasingly more
advanced technologies to analyze application behaviors, the
network’s poor understanding is still a roadblock to realizing
fine-grained control.
Name or Name Prefix
Other parameters
Name of data
Payload
Signature
Interest Packet Data Packet
Optional Signature
Figure 1: Interest packet and Data packet in NDN
2.4 Our Insights
In this work, our goal is to build a home system where (i) the
cloud backend is removed from the control loop totally, and
(ii) users manage the whole system, including defining de-
vices and applications’ rights to access data or to command
devices.
To realize such a system, we propose a framework where
user control is enforced over the network layer. However,
unlike existing network-based approaches, we build our sys-
tem over a network protocol that can bring application-level
semantics to the network layer – Named Data Networking
(NDN). By naming devices, applications, and resources with
predefined conventions, security modules in our system can
obtain sufficient information tomake security decisions with-
out bothering application logic. These security modules will
then enforce user control for each network packet in the
local system.
NDN [43] is a proposed future Internet architecture which
uses application-level semantically meaningful names at the
network layer. This is in sharp contrast to TCP/IP networks
where communication is based on IP addresses and port
numbers. With the name of data, applications can fetch this
piece of data from the network without considering where
the data is being host. To be more specific, the named data is
carried by a Data packet while a request is called an Interest
packet (Figure 1).
To secure communication, NDN supports data-centric se-
curity [45] as a new model compared with existing channel-
based security (e.g., TLS). In this model, NDN packets can be
signed using public key cryptography and verified regard-
less of where packets are coming from, thus ensuring the
authenticity of the packet name and its payload. Importantly,
names can be used to reason about security. For example,
Yu et. al has proposed to use name relations to represent
trust [42]. In our work, we also utilize the power of names
and name relations to realize user’s control.
3 SYSTEM OVERVIEW
We turn to the design of Sovereign by illustrating how it
supports a typical application scenario.
3.1 A Glance of Sovereign
A user Alice has a Sovereign home IoT system with a number
of IoT devices and applications (which are running over
3
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a home hub). Unlike the situation in a cloud-based home
system, Alice owns the trust anchor (i.e., root credential) of
the home and can directly manage the privileges of each
system participant. Alice controls the home through a local
IoT controller, which is an app on her phone or a dedicated
home hub. In Sovereign, all participants and resources can
be uniquely identified by a name. Therefore the controller
will translate Alice’s control decisions to security policies
which are based on names and distribute them to the whole
system. By enforcing these name-based policies, only parties
authorized by Alice can access certain private data or execute
certain services in the local system.
Taking a look at lower layers, the security of the system is
reflected on every single network packet sent and received
in the system. To be more specific, each packet can be au-
thenticated so that no command or access can be spoofed
by attackers. At the same time, private payloads carried by
these packets are encrypted and only authorized parties can
decrypt them.
From an IoT developer’s perspective, Sovereign provides
usable tools for them to build devices or applications. Though
developed in a similar style as in many existing IoT platforms,
devices and applications in Sovereign are entirely owned and
controlled by end users. With local user control, the chance
of unauthorized remote control to the device/application is
minimal.
3.2 Main Challenges
As described above, Sovereign works in a very different way
from existing home IoT systems. However, to realize it, three
technical questions should be taken into consideration.
• How to name things? In Sovereign, all devices, applica-
tions, and resources have a semantically meaningful name.
These names are supposed to compose user-defined poli-
cies and be used in every NDN packet to provide sufficient
information for security mechanisms to enforce user con-
trol. Therefore, how to design a set of naming conventions
to satisfy these needs is a problem.
• How to localize security modules while keeping the
reliability? In cloud-based IoT systems, security modules
(e.g., bootstrapping, access control, trust management), by
large, are realized on the rendezvous point – the cloud
backend. When security modules function locally, follow-
ing the same centralized design brings serious single point
of failure problem. For example, since most home IoT sys-
tems do not have a backup rendezvous point (e.g., a backup
home hub), when this device is down, end users cannot
even unlock the door. In Sovereign, security modules are
expected towork reliably at local level and provide security
without a rendezvous point.
ŏ
Naming Convention (§4)
Devices and 
Applications
Pub/Sub (§6)
Security
Bootstrapping
Trust 
Management 
Access 
Control 
Integrated into
Follow local Security Modules (§5)
End Users
Control
Local Trust 
Anchor
User-defined 
Policies
Figure 2: Sovereign overview.
• How to make local security modules usable for de-
velopers?Although developers maywant to protect users’
security and privacy, we can not assume they can always
properly utilize security and crypto APIs. Thus, how to
make our local security modules easy-to-use is a problem.
3.3 Sovereign’s Approach
The whole system starts from a local trust anchor – a public
key certificate that contains the unique name of the home and
the public key bounded with the name. To handle the three
challenges in §3.2, there are three main technical compo-
nents, making our system a fully user-controlled autonomous
IoT system for smart home (Figure 2).
1. Semanticallymeaningful names of things (§4). We
design Sovereign naming conventions to name devices, ap-
plications, and resources under the home namespace in a
structured way. These names bears application level seman-
tics and are directly used at the network layer (i.e., NDN)
for content and command delivery. Furthermore, end users
define security policies leveraging these conventions, e.g.,
whether devices under a namespace can access data under
another namespace.
2. Localized securitymodules functions on each sys-
tem participant (§5). In Sovereign, basic security modules,
including security bootstrapping, trust management and ac-
cess control, enforce user control locally. Specifically, these
modules operate in a decentralized way: by delivering user
defined policies to each system participant, the user control
is enforced for every network packet on every sender and
receiver. Even in the case when the local controller is down,
the security of the system stays the same.
3. Usability byDesign-in Security (§6). Sovereign seam-
lessly integrates all local security modules into a pub/sub
messaging module. By calling pub/sub APIs, each device
and application can automatically add/verify the security
of each outgoing/incoming network packet against user-
defined policies. In this way, Sovereign provides developers
with easy-to-use development tools.
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3.4 Assumptions
Sovereign assumes the local IoT system to be a networked
system based on wireless broadcast media, e.g., WiFi, IEEE
802.15.4 [38]. Heterogeneous broadcast media can be bridged
together through hardware and software, e.g., a home hub.
NDN naturally supports multi-homing because the network
identifiers are not bound with NICs.
Sovereign assumes the existence of one or more devices in
the local system serving the role of a home controller. This
can be, for example, a dedicated home controller hub or a
device with sufficient storage and computation power, like
a smart TV or a smart phone. There could exist multiple
controllers at the same time.
We realize Sovereign as an IoT application development
platform and thus we also assume all the IoT devices at home
are programmed over Sovereign SDK. Later in this paper
(§8.2), we show that existing pub/sub based applications can
be easily migrated to Sovereign SDK and support local user
control.
4 NAMING
Sovereign establishes control mechanisms over structured
and application-level semantics exposed by a set of names
following naming conventions. Therefore, it is important
that we properly describe Sovereign’s naming conventions
with explanations.
Following conventions, names in Sovereign have two prop-
erties. First, names convey application information; each
name explicitly conveys what data is being fetched and what
service is being called. Second, names are strictly verified;
packets with erroneous names will be rejected by receiving
side or intermediate devices that support Sovereign. To en-
sure the correctness of name verification, Sovereign follows
NDN’s security principles [45] and each name is protected
by packet digital signature.
Therefore, in this section, we start by describing Sover-
eign’s naming conventions (§4.1), and then explain how
names can be authenticated (§4.2). We end this section by
shedding some light on how names can be leveraged through
security policies to control trustworthiness and access rights
in our system (§4.3). We leave a more detailed description of
control mechanisms in later sections.
4.1 Naming Conventions
HomeName: Sovereign considers each home IoT system an
autonomous system with a unique namespace. To be specific,
the namespace is represented in a format of “/str1_str2”.
The first string is customized by end users and the second
part is a randomness to ensure the uniqueness. For example,
Alice’s home name can be “alice-home_rMWNG9yBwp” (here-
after we omit the randomness part for simplicity).
Hom
e
Service
Type
Locator
<home-prefix>
<service-id>
<location>
<dev/app-id>
CMD
<location>
CONTENT
<content-id>
Data Name TreeIdentity Name Tree
<location>
<cmd-id>
<dev/app-id> <dev/app-id>
ACCESS
EKEY DKEY
Access Key Name Tree
<key-id>
<timestamp>
<location>
<service-id>
<home-prefix> <home-prefix>
<service-id> <service-id>
<timestamp> <timestamp>
Figure 3: Naming conventions in Sovereign.
Importantly, there exists a public key certificate, called the
trust anchor certificate, which binds the home root digital
key and the home namespace together. Such a certificate is
self-signed and will be securely installed by every system
participant during the security bootstrapping (§5.1). The
corresponding private key must be kept only by a home
owner.
Under the home namespace, all devices, applications, and
resources (e.g., content, command, digital keys) are named
as shown in Figure 3.
Identity Name: In Sovereign, devices applications (here-
after called devices) and applications are all represented by
the identity name:
/<home-prefix>/<service-id>/<location>/<device-or-app-id>1
For example, a temperature sensor in Alice’s bedroom has
a name “/alice-home/TEMP/bedroom/sensor-1”, and a hub-
host application can be named as “/alice-home/APP/home-hub
/light-control-1”. When a device provides more than one
service, it has multiple identity names accordingly, where
each name has a different “service-id”.
Associated with each identity name, there is also an iden-
tity key, which is a public key pair named as:
/<home-prefix>/<service-id>/<identity-name>/KEY/<key-id>
A certificate issued by the local controller binds the key name
with the public key bits through a digital signature. Such a
certificate is an NDN Data packet; it is fetchable by the key
name and can be verified using the trust anchor certificate.
Command Name: A command to trigger certain actions
on designated device(s) also has a unique name:
/<home-prefix>/<service-id>/CMD/<locator>/<command-
id>/<timestamp>
The “<locator>” defines the effect scope of the command. It
can be empty, one component, or two components; accord-
ingly, it means the command is to command service providers
in the whole system, at certain location, or a specific service
provider. For example, three different commands to turn on
air conditioners with different locators are shown in Table 1.
1A pair of < > in NDN name represents one or more name components.
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A “<command-id>” is an application-defined component to
identify the type of a command, e.g.,“poweroff”; it will be
encrypted with a per-service key in real Sovereign systems.
turn on all air
conditioners /alice-home/AIRCON/CMD/on
turn on bedroom air
conditioners /alice-home/AIRCON/ CMD/bedroom/on
turn on specific air
conditioner
/alice-home/AIRCON/
CMD/bedroom/ac-1/on
Table 1: Command Names with Different Locators
Content Name: Similarly, each piece of content has a con-
tent name:
/<home-prefix>/<service-id>/CONTENT/<producer-
locator>/<content-id>/<timestamp>
The home prefix, service ID, and the producer locator can
recover content producer’s identity name. For example, the
temperature content “/alice-home/TEMP/CONTENT/bedroom
/sensor1/temp-fahrenheit/<timestamp>” is generated by
the device “/alice-home/TEMP/bedroom/sensor1”. Similarly,
the “content-id” is to identify the content type and will be
encrypted to protect user privacy.
Access Key Names: Besides identity keys, each device/ap-
plication also owns a number of access keys, which are used
by the Sovereign access control module to protect sensitive
data. Access keys are named as:
/<home-prefix>/ACCESS/EKEY/<service-id>/<key-id>
/<home-prefix>/ACCESS/DKEY/<service-id>/<key-id>
“EKEY” identifies encryption keys while “DKEY” is only used in
decryption key names. “<service-id>” indicates data under
which service should be protected or accessed with the key.
4.2 Verifiable Names
Sovereign builds security mechanisms over names and name
relations and thus the authenticity of names is of vital im-
portance: one must verify the name carried by a network
packet is genuine.
In Sovereign, content, commands, and digital keys are
kept in NDN Data packets with names introduced above and
these packets are cryptographically signed when published.
Importantly, the signing key name is also embedded in each
Data packet with its signature. Therefore, the authenticity
of the packet (including its name and signing key name) can
be verified by verifying the certificate chain: A receiver of a
Data packet can first fetch the public key certificate of the
signing key to verify the packet signature. To further ensure
the signer is truly a system member, the receiver can then
verify the signature of the certificate using the trust anchor
certificate, which is installed by every participant during the
security bootstrapping (5.1).
4.3 Names and User Control
Based on rich-semantic and verifiable names, user-defined
security policies can be represented by names and realized
by restricting relations among named entities. In Sovereign,
there are two types of security policies.
• Trust policies define who can issue what commands. Users
grant devices and applications the privileges to command
others by trust policies. Trust policies regulate relations
between signing key names and command names – only
identity keys with certain names can sign and issue com-
mands of certain command names.
• Access policy defines who can access what content. They
grant access rights to devices and applications by allowing
certain relations between signing key names and access
key names – only identity keys with certain names can
sign and send requests to fetch keys of certain access key
names.
A more detailed description can be found in the next section.
5 DECENTRALIZED LOCAL SECURITY
MODULES
To allow users’ control on content and executables in a home
system, three security modules must be provided.
• Security bootstrapping: New devices/applications in-
stall the local trust anchor and obtain identity names and
digital keys.
• Trustmanagement: End usersmanagewhich devices/ap-
plications can command which services (e.g., only the
home owner can unlock the door).
• Access control: End users decide which devices/applica-
tions can access which set of content (e.g.,Air conditioners
can access temperature content in the bedroom).
In existing IoT systems, security modules work in a cen-
tralized way: all devices connect to a rendezvous point (e.g.,
a cloud backend as in [2, 33]) for authentication and access
control (Figure 4(a)). However, in a local IoT system, this
centralized design suffers from serious single point of failure
problem because of the lack of redundancy in the home en-
vironment. For example, consider a home system where all
devices and applications connect to the local home hub for
security verification, since most home systems do not have a
backup hub, when the hub is down, all security modules are
disabled and a user may not even be able to unlock the door.
Thanks to advances in hardware technologies, current
commodity IoT platforms can be equipped with usable com-
putation, storage, and dedicated crypto chips (e.g., elliptic
curve chip ATECC508A), so it is possible to realize security
modules at each system participant. For example, §8.4 shows
that a constrained device with 64MHz CPU and 256K mem-
ory can effectively operate all security modules in Sovereign.
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Overhear
D2D 
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Secured 
Channels
Figure 4: Design of security modules in current IoT
systems and in Sovereign.
Therefore, in Sovereign, localized security modules func-
tion in a decentralized way. First, users bootstrap devices and
applications through the local controller (5.1). In this process,
each device and application installs the trust anchor and ob-
tains the necessary keys to execute security modules later.
After that, based on user-defined policies, each device/appli-
cation runs the trust management module (§5.2) and access
control module (§5.3) locally to secure every network packet
in the system. When some devices (even the local controller)
are down, the other working devices still perform well.
5.1 Bootstrapping
Bootstrapping is the prerequisite of trust management and
access control since a device or an application obtains neces-
sary names and keys in this process.
In Sovereign, a user uses the controller to bootstrap a
new device through device-to-device communication (e.g.,
Bluetooth). The mutual trust between the device and the
controller is based on certain out-of-band means such as QR
code scanning. To be more specific, the following keying
material is exchanged.
(1) The device will install the trust anchor certificate so that
it can authenticate messages published by the controller
and other system members.
(2) The controller certifies the device and issues certificates
for the device’s identity keys. With a certified identity
key, content and commands published by the device can
be authenticated by other system members.
(3) The device obtains encryption keys to encrypt data gen-
erated by itself and decryption keys to access data pub-
lished under other services.
Protocol [21] shows a concrete construction of device se-
curity bootstrapping in Sovereign. Bootstrapping an appli-
cation is similar to the aforementioned steps, whereas the
out-of-band verification is through the user’s operations (e.g.,
installing the app from a trustworthy source).
After security bootstrapping, each device and application
in the system have sufficient keys to secure every Data packet
generated by itself and authenticate other packets published
Hom
e
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Locator
alice-home
LOCK APP
livingroom
front
hub
app-1
alice-home
LOCK
CMD
livingroom
CONTENT
front
livingroom
front
statelock
1
2
3
4
5
Data Name TreeIdentity Name Tree
bedroom
Figure 5: Fine-grained Trust Policies
in the system. Authorized parties can also access to payloads
of Data packets.
5.2 Trust Management
Sovereign’s trust management is based on names and public
key cryptography. In a nutshell, users define trust policies
by allowing certain name relations, so network packets that
violate these name relations will be rejected by the receiving
end. In this process, since packets are protected by their
public key signatures, packet names and signer names cannot
be spoofed.
Operating locally: Each device and application executes
its local trust management module to sign every outgoing
packet and verify all the incoming packets. This is feasible
because the device/application has the trust anchor and their
own identity keys have been certified by the controller. To be
more specific, each content and command published under a
service S is signed by its producer’s identity key whose key
name contains S . Once the receiver’s trust module receives
content or a command published by other devices/applica-
tions, it, following user-defined trust policies, first verifies
the signature to ensure it is generated by a valid system
member. Then it checks data name and signing identity key
name; if such a key is not allowed to sign this piece of named
data, the packet will be dropped. Security policies, signed
and published by the local controller, are distributed to de-
vices/applications through pub/sub (§6.1).
Fine-grained Trust Policy: The trust management in
Sovereign is of fine granularity thanks to the use of names.
To be more specific, the user’s trust policies are represented
by allowed name relations: a set of named keys are allowed to
sign a set of named content or commands. All the content and
commands with invalid signatures or signed by improper
named keys will be rejected.
For example, we can use the name trees shown in Fig-
ure 5 to represent several different trust policies. The left
tree represents two identities – a lock device “/alice-home
/LOCK/livingroom/front” in the living room and an appli-
cation “/alice-home/APP/hub/app-1” hosted by the home
hub. Notice that each of them have a signing key with their
7
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Figure 6: Access Control in Sovereign
identity name as the prefix. The right tree represents names
of related commands and content. For example, the name
“/alice-home/LOCK/CMD/livingroom/front/unlock” repre-
sents the command to unlock this lock. In the figure, each
bold arrow represents a policy: a key under an identity name
in the left tree can sign packets with the names in the right
tree.
• Policy ➊ defines that a controller can sign and issue com-
mands with prefix “/alice-home/LOCK/CMD”, which means
the controller can control all the lock devices, including
those in the living room and all the other rooms.
• Policies ➋, ➌, and ➍ are of three levels of granularity.
They define the hub application “app-1” can command all
locks in the bed room (room wide), the “front” lock (device
wide), and issue only the lock command to the “front” lock
(command wide), respectively.
• Policy ➎ requires that only the lock “front” can produce
the state of itself.
Notice that the name used in a policy is not necessarily a
name prefix. Sovereign supports the use of regular expression
in trust policies. For example, a policy that allows a key to
sign named packets with name
/alice-home/<>/CMD/livingroom/<>*
means the key can be used to command any devices under
any service in the living room.
5.3 Access Control
Similarly, the access control module in Sovereign is also
based on names. In Sovereign, the payload carried by each
network packet is encrypted in a data-centric way [44]: the
ciphertext is not bound with a channel (e.g., TLS); any party
who has the decryption key can access it.
Operating locally: Each system participant executes the
access control model to encrypt the payload of every packet
it publishes and decrypt payloads of those packets that it can
access. All the access control keys have been installed after
the bootstrapping process. As shown in Figure 6, depending
on the user-defined access policies, the controller will reply
with the requested keys or reject the request (in which case
it may need end users’ decisions).
Access Policy: The name relations in access control pol-
icy are in the format: a set of named keys are allowed to sign
the request for named encryption/decryption keys. The con-
troller will not reply with the access keys if the request is
not signed by designated identity keys. Access policies also
support fine-grained control. For example, in the name trees
shown in Figure 6, three bold arrows represent three access
rights with different granularity.
• Policy ➊ defines that all air conditioning devices in all the
rooms can sign the request for the temperature decryption
key (i.e., get access to the temperature data).
• Policy ➋ represents that all air conditioning devices can
access to the temperature data
• Policy ➌ defines the device “ac-1” can access to the tem-
perature data.
Same as trust policies, Sovereign allows the use of regular
expressions in access policy as well.
6 USABILITY BY DESIGN-IN SECURITY
Since localized security modules need to be supported by
each system participant, we need to provide an easy way
for devices and applications to use them. Sovereign does not
require developers to be security experts who have to dive
into the security and crypto details.
To provide ease of use, Sovereign adopts pub/sub as the
way of communicating in the local home system (§6.1). Im-
portantly, since the security modules function locally and
solely takes input (i.e., user-defined policies) from the local
controller, all security modules can be integrated into pub/-
sub seamlessly (§6.2). Therefore, without any extra efforts,
developers can make devices and applications that support
users’ local control by simply calling pub/sub APIs (§6.3).
6.1 Pub/Sub based Communication
Pub/sub is a messaging pattern where data is categorized
into topics to which message producers (called publishers)
publish their messages without knowing the set of message
consumers (called subscribers). Similarly, subscribers receive
messages under topics that are of interest. At present pub/sub
has been widely used in IoT application development (e.g.,
SmartThings, Amazon AWS IoT). Being data-centric and
name-based, NDN supports pub/sub naturally.
Based on naming conventions (§4), Sovereign treats topic
identifiers as NDNname prefixes. For example, “/alice-home
/TEMP/CONTENT/bedroom” can refer to the temperature in the
bedroom. Following this direction, publishing content or
command to a topic is to generate Data packets named under
the topic prefix while subscribing to a topic is to fetch Data
packets from the name prefix with Interest packets.
In this way, communication among the controller, devices,
and applications can be effectively realized by pub/sub.
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• User-defined Policy Distribution: Users configure se-
curity policies through the local controller and these poli-
cies will be published by the controller. After users con-
figure policies, the local controller publishes policies to a
topic (e.g.,“/alice-home/POLICY”), to which is subscribed
by all system participants by default. Published policies,
signed by the private key corresponded to the trust anchor,
can be verified by devices and applications in Sovereign.
• Content Delivery: Content is distributed among devices
and applications through pub/sub. To be more specific, de-
vices/applications wrap content into Data packets named
under the corresponding topic name prefix following nam-
ing conventions (§4). These Data packets can be fetched
with Interest packets carrying the topic name prefix by
subscribers either in a periodic manner or immediately
after hearing a notification.
• Command Delivery: A command is also generated by
pub in a similar way as content delivery. Since commands
are usually in real time, a notification will be broadcast to
the system to trigger an immediate fetch.
Importantly, utilizing NDN and the local broadcast media,
pub/sub in Sovereign does not require a centralized broker.
This is because there is no need for the mapping between
each topic and its subscribers (e.g., in MQTT [7], subscribers
are identified by their IP addresses and port number). This re-
duces the system’s dependency on a single point: even when
the controller is down, the system is still by and large se-
cured because unauthorized operations will still be dropped
at command receivers.
6.2 Integrate Security Modules in Pub/Sub
In Sovereign, we integrate all security modules under pub/-
sub (Figure 7), thus application developers only need to call
our pub/sub APIs to enjoy Sovereign’s user control, without
operating with our security modules.
Application
Space
Logic in Pub
Logic in Sub
Local 
NDN
 Network
Pub API
Sub API
Access Control Trust Management 
cmd or 
content
Encrypt
Decrypt
Sign
Verify
Data
packet
Data
packet
Available 
to
Fetch
 from
cmd or 
content
Figure 7: Security processing flow in pub/sub
To be more specific, after security bootstrapping and with
user-defined policies, pub/sub in Sovereign works as follows.
• Pub:When a device/application is publishing content or
command, Sovereign will (i) name the content/command
following naming conventions, (ii) invoke the access con-
trol module to use a matched encryption key to encrypt
the content or the command, and (iii) invoke the trust man-
agement module to use a proper signing key according to
trust policies to sign the packet. After that, the published
data are available to the local network.
• Sub: After a device/application subscribes to a topic, when
new updates arrive, Sovereign will (i) invoke the trust man-
agement module to verify the signature and then check the
data name and signing key name against the trust policies,
and (ii) invoke the access control module to decrypt the
content if the subscriber has the right to access it. Eventu-
ally, only verified and decrypted payloads will be passed
to application logic.
As shown above, Sovereign will automatically apply se-
curity protection to each packet generated and verify the
security of each packet received.
6.3 An Example of Pub/Sub
We use an air conditioner control pub/sub example to illus-
trate the process of pub/sub along with the security modules.
In our example, we have an application (“/alice-home/APP
/hub/app-1”) to control the air conditioner (“/alice-home
/AIRCON/bedroom/ac-1”) on certain conditions. We assume
there is a policy: “/alice-home/APP/hub/app-1/KEY” can sign
commands under “/alice-home/AIRCON/CMD”, and both of
them have obtained the necessary signing keys and access
rights during the security bootstrapping.
Applications: publishing command. The application
publishes a command to set the temperature to be “70F” on air
conditioners in the bedroom. With the function called, Sov-
ereign will generate an NDN Data packet accordingly. First,
following naming conventions, the packet will be named as
/alice-home/AIRCON/CMD/bedroom/set-temp/<timestamp>
Then the command payload, which is “70F”, will be encrypted
with a encryption key with name prefix
/alice-home/ACCESS/EKEY/AIRCON
After that, according to the policy, the packet will be signed
by the application’s signing key
/alice-home/APP/hub/app-1/KEY
Finally, this encrypted and signed packet will become avail-
able to the local network with a broadcast Interest as a noti-
fication.
Device: subscribing command. The air conditioner sub-
scribes to commands on air conditioning service. Once a
notification Interest arrives, the air conditioner checks the
name of newly published data; since the device’s own iden-
tity name is within the command’s scope, “/bedroom”, the
air conditioner will send out an Interest packet to fetch the
command Data packet immediately.
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Figure 8: Sovereign Development Kit
After getting the command packet, the device first verifies
its signature and checks the packet name and signing key
name against user-defined trust policies. If the signing key
does not have a valid certificate issued by the trust anchor or
is not allowed to issue the command, this command will be
dropped. After that, the device decrypts the content using
the corresponding decryption key and finally executes the
decrypted command.
7 IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we describe how our Sovereign is realized
for developers and end users. For device and application
developers, Sovereign has been implemented as an open
source cross-platform software development kit (SDK)2 in
standard C11. Its core library contains more than 51K lines
of code and has been developed and maintained for more
than one and a half years. In addition, we also implement
a prototype of the local controller with GUI in python for
end users to bootstrap devices/applications and control the
system.
Sovereign SDK (Figure 8) includes a core library and adap-
tations to different software and hardware platforms. The
core library realizes the pub/sub module, security modules,
and other supporting functionalities, while the adaptation
layer makes the core library cross-platform and work with
dedicated crypto chips. So far, we have successfully adapted
our SDK to various platforms, including Linux/Unix, Rasp-
bian, RIOT OS [6], and Nordic NRF boards, with support of
different layer protocols, including Bluetooth, IEEE 802.15.4,
and legacy IP3.
8 EVALUATION
In this section, we first show that Sovereign can realize user
control purely locally, addressing the security and private is-
sues caused by relying on cloud backends (§8.1). Second, our
empirical evaluations show that Sovereign provides usable
tools for developers (§8.2) and does not require extra opera-
tions from end users (§8.3). Third, we evaluate Sovereign’s
performance (§8.4). Compared with existing cloud-based IoT
systems, Sovereign does not introduce significant system
2https://github.com/sovereign-home/sovereign-core
3NDN considers IP/TCP/UDP as link layer protocols
overhead. We also show that, using only a small amount
of memory and flash, Sovereign can function normally on
constrained devices.
8.1 Privacy and Security Assessment: Case
Study and Comparison
We assess Sovereign’s privacy and security by analyzing
packet flows in two real programs in Sovereign and Smart-
Things. Specifically, we select a typical open-source device
program and an application program from official Smart-
Things GitHub repositories and port them into Sovereign.
The pseudo codes of original programs and their Sovereign
based versions are shown in Figure 9. The selected programs
are simple but representative: the device program (code block
1 & 2) changes its own state to “on” when it gets a turn-on
command from an authorized party; the application program
(code block 3 & 4) subscribes to the state of a contact sensor
and turn on the switch when the contact sensor is touched.
Bootstrapping. In the SmartThings device program (code
block 1), the first line of the code connects the device to
the home’s cloud backend. After that, the cloud recognizes
this new device, learns its profile, and registers it to the
cloud database. In contrast, the first line of the Sovereign
program code (code block 2) bootstraps the device to a local
controller with no traffic out of the home system. In addition,
all the sensitive information transmitted in the bootstrapping
protocol is protected by encryption.
Pub/Sub. The first lines in both the SmartThings appli-
cation (code block 3) and the Sovereign application (code
block 4) subscribe to certain topics in the home system. How-
ever, the underlying operations are very different: the Smart-
Things application notifies the cloud backend its interest in
certain services while the Sovereign application simply starts
to listen to data published under a new name prefix in the
local network. Similarly, the SmartThings application pro-
gram turns on the switch with “pub_content”, after which,
the program sends a message to the cloud backend and the
cloud backend then sends another command back to turn
on the home switch. In contrast, publishing a command in
Sovereign application is nothing more than making a new
Data packet available in the local network.
The comparison shows that, Sovereign does not expose
any control information to remote parties while at the same
time achieves the same goals as in cloud-based systems. Since
Sovereign encrypts and signs each packet in the local net-
work, it is difficult for a remote or a local (e.g., attackers
in neighborhood) attacker to forge commands or to learn
private information by eavesdropping the traffic.
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Code block 1: SmartThings Device (C)
1 st_conn_init(credential, device_info); //connects to the cloud
2 st_cap_cmd_set_cb("on",callback);//set callback for cmd from the cloud
3 ...
4 void callback(evt) {
5 event = st_cap_attr_create_string("switch", "on"); // update self state
6 st_cap_attr_send(event); // send new state to the cloud
Code block 2: Sovereign Device (C)
1 bootstrapping(credential, device_info); //sign on to the local controller
2 sub_to_command(SWITCH, callback); //sub to a cmd topic
3 ...
4 void callback(context, event) {
5 pub_content(SWITCH, "state", "on"); // pub the new state
Code block 3: SmartApp (Groovy)
1 subscribe("contact.open", callback) // sub to contact sensors
2 ...
3 def callback(evt) {
4 switches.on() // let the cloud turn on switches at home
Code block 4: Sovereign App (C)
1 sub_to_content(CONTACT, callback) // sub to a content topic
2 ...
3 void callback(context, event) {
4 if (event.id = "state" && event.payload = "on")
5 pub_command(SWITCH, "/", "on"); // pub a cmd to all switches
Figure 9: Pseudo Code in SmartThings and Sovereign
8.2 Usability: Software Development
Sovereign provides developers with pub/sub APIs, allowing
developers to easily port IoT device and application pro-
grams from existing pub/sub based platforms to Sovereign.
Figure 9 shows the line-by-line comparison between the
original SmartThings programs and their Sovereign based
versions. The comparison and our experience show that,
though some trivial modifications (e.g., language change,
pub/sub function names and parameters change) are needed,
the migration does not require developers to change the
main logic of a program.
8.3 Usability: User Experience
Moving control from the cloud backend to the local network,
Sovereign does not necessarily need to degrade user experi-
ences. To illustrate how end users potentially use our system,
we perform an integration test using a Raspberry PI 3 mode
B+ (RPI) as an IoT device and a laptop as the controller, and
we count the major operations required by end users to add
a new device or to issue a command to a device.
As shown in Table 2, though UIs are not optimized to
be as user-friendly as a real product, Sovereign does not
System Bootstrapping Issue commands
RPI LED light
in Sovereign
1. QR code scanning. 2. Click
searching on controller. 3.
Input room and device name.
Select target
device/application
and action.
AWS IoT LED
light [26]
1. Bootstrap the device with
third party mobile phone app.
2. Add devices on Alexa app by
login to third party account.
Voice control; Select
target device and
action (phone app).
SmartThings
LED light [29]
1. Select device type. 2. Input
room and device name. 3. Click
to search and connect.
Voice control; Select
target device and
action (phone app).
Table 2: A trust policy on command call
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Figure 10: User-perceived Latency of Common Opera-
tions in Sovereign and Amazon AWS IoT
require more manual operations from end users compared
with current industrial smart home IoT solutions.
8.4 Performance
We show that Sovereign does not pose extra latency overhead
and storage/memory overhead to the system even though
all security operations are local.
Latency of Common Operations. We provide the over-
all time consumption to finish common operations in Sover-
eign and AWS IoT, including device bootstrapping, content
delivery (by subscribing to a service), and command deliv-
ery (by publishing a command). We first compare the over-
all latency of communicating with a RPI (ARM cortex A53
@1.4GHz) device in AWS IoT and in Sovereign. As shown
in the left two bars in Figure 10, though security operations
are done by the local system, Sovereign does not need the
long round trip time to the cloud and thus has a similar or
even lower latency: Sovereign is 6% slower, 62% faster, and
42% faster than AWS IoT in device bootstrapping, content
delivery, and command delivery, respectively. We also test
Sovereign over a more constrained device, NRF52840 (ARM
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Figure 11: Breakdown of the execution time of compu-
tational phases in Sovereign Device/Application
cortex M4 @64MHz), over the IEEE 802.15.4 link layer proto-
col4. As shown in the right bar in the figure, because of the
low computation power, it takes longer time than using a
RPI to finish measured operations. Nevertheless, the latency
of bootstrapping (which only needs to be done for one time)
is still less than 1 second and commonly-used pub/sub only
takes less than 0.5 seconds, which is practical enough to be
deployed in real systems.
Execution Time Breakdown. We provide the break-
down of execution time of applications and devices devel-
oped with Sovereign SDK using different levels of hardware:
a core i7 laptop (as the home hub), a RPI, and an NRF52840.
The micro operations being measured include digital sig-
nature signing and verification (e.g., ECDSA), content en-
cryption and decryption (e.g., AES CBC), policy checking,
NDN packet encoding/decoding, and other crypto opera-
tions (e.g., ECDH, KDF). Figure 11 shows the results obtained
from bootstrapping process and pub/sub. Our results show
that the most time consuming operations are asymmetric
cryptographic operations, especially on a constrained device.
However, the execution time can be much reduced when
dedicated crypto chips are used.
ROM and RAM Use. We also evaluated the ROM and
RAM use of IoT devices programmed over Sovereign. The
hardware platform we used is NRF52840, which only has
1MB ROM, 0.25MB RAM, and a 32-bit Cortex M4@64MHz
CPU. Table 3 shows the RAM and ROM use of a subscriber
and a publisher programmed in Sovereign over RIOT OS [6].
A detailed breakdown of memory and flash use is also shown
in the table. We show that Sovereign can successfully oper-
ate with all main modules mounted and only uses < 70KB
memory and flash on a constrained device.
4Limited by IEEE 802.15.4 support on the hardware, we use another
NRF52840 as a simplified controller in this test.
Program/Modules ROM Use RAM Use
Subscriber in total 62KB 47.3KB
Publisher in total 52.4KB 38.2KB
Application 1.8% 7.3%
High-level Modules 20.7% 34.2%
Utilities 3.3% 14.4%
Crypto Tools 25.1% 0.2%
Network Forwarder 24.1% 25.0%
OS and Adaptation 25.1% 18.9%
Table 3: ROM and RAM Consumption
9 FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
Does Sovereign eliminate the use of cloud?
No. Sovereign gets rid of the cloud backend of a home system
to let end users fully control the trust anchor and define
policies. However, this does not mean eliminating the use
of cloud services. Rather, Sovereign can make use of cloud
resources to better serve end users.
First, cloud services can and should be used as backup
storage for user data. Sovereign has the data encrypted at
production, using cloud storage resources while keeping data
confidentiality. Second, a cloud-hosted application can also
be used as a Sovereign application. By establishing secure
connectivity from cloud to the home network through the
home hub (which is an NDN forwarder), a remote application
acts like a hub-hosted application and its rights to access
resources or devices can only be granted by the local con-
troller. Third, a cloud service should also be used when the
user is not at home. In this scenario, to send a message to a
home without a public static IP address, the cloud service
can be used as a bridge to tunnel through Network Address
Translation (NAT). Notice that a cloud server in this context
only serves as a forwarder for already secured NDN packets,
without getting confidential information from the packets.
What major challenges remain in realizing a secure
and user-controlled home system?
Building secure and user-controlled home systems requires
efforts from different aspects. First, applications must be cor-
rectly designed and implemented. Currently, this is done
by the IoT service providers, e.g., Apple’s MFI [4]. However,
supporting an open market would desire third party trusted
organizations to take the responsibility. Second, today’s stove
pipe solutions have occupied a big market, where IoT ecosys-
tems are usually incompatible with each other and so are
devices. A home user may own several different IoT systems
at the same time. Recent trend [27] to increase compatibility
among smart home products shows the right direction to go.
Does Sovereign require NDN deployment outside the
local home network?
No. Sovereign deploys NDN at the local home network and
does not assume the wide deployment outside the local net-
work. In fact, even the deployment of NDN at the local home
12
Sovereign: User-Controlled Smart Homes SIGCOMM, 2020,
network is transparent to developers and end users because
it is automatically configured by Sovereign SDK.
10 CONCLUSION
Our research aims to show that user control in home IoT sys-
tem can be realized without relying on a cloud backend. Fun-
damentally different from today’s dominating cloud-based
system model, in Sovereign, control of the home is in the
hands of end users. Through our work, we show that to re-
ally control the home, end users must own the system trust
anchor. We also identify the advantages of using semantic
names to realize user control: these names help the system to
understand application behaviors and thus to better enforce
user control.
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A THE ROLE OF THE CLOUD BACKEND
IN EXISTING HOME IOT SYSTEMS
Amazon AWS IoT: AWS IoT consists of three main compo-
nents: cloud-connected devices, cloud-hosted applications,
and the AWS Cloud. In an AWS IoT home system, devices
and applications must connect to the AWS Cloud through
TLS with mutual authentication. Therefore, each device and
application must install two public key certificates in ad-
vance: one is AWS’s certificate as the trust anchor and the
other one is device/application certificate, which was issued
when developers registered their products at AWS. The cloud
serves as the message broker and the authority to manage
the system – any unauthorized access to home resources will
be rejected by the cloud. Though the recent AWS Greengrass
framework encourages local communication, the manage-
ment is still realized at the cloud.
Google IoT Core: Google IoT Core defines a device as a
processing unit that is capable of connecting to the Internet
and exchanging data with the cloud backend. Each device
registry is created in a specific cloud region and belongs
to a cloud project. The device configuration is done by a
user-defined blob sent from cloud. Similarly to AWS, trust
management and access control under this framework go
through cloud, leveraging the Identity and Access Manage-
ment module, using the cloud as a rendezvous point.
Microsoft Azure IoT: Azure IoT uses the cloud to inter-
act with individual devices. When receiving data, analysis
will be performed at cloud side which is connected to other
Azure cloud services. In D2D scenario, cloud will also act as a
message broker between devices. In the middle of cloud back-
end and devices, a predefined cloud gateway called Azure
IoT Hub is involved. Azure IoT Hub has the capabaility of
identity management for devices. When connecting to the
cloud, the device and cloud will be mutual authenticated by
a TLS-based handshake.
14
